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THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS OF LAWYER
ADVERTISING-THEORETICAL AND
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE
R.M.J.
DOUGLAS WHITMAN*
CLYDE D. STOLTENBERG**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has looked favorably upon the advertise-
ment of routine professional services by attorneys. Indeed, al-
though the Court has recognized the fears expressed by opponents
of such advertising, including the adverse effect on professionalism
and the inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising,' it
has concluded that a rule prohibiting advertising by lawyers is not
* B.A., Knox College, 1970; J.D., University of Missouri, 1973; M.B.A., University of
Kansas, 1975; LL.M., University of Missouri at Kansas City, 1982.
** B.A., University of Iowa, 1969; J.D., Harvard University, 1972.
1 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-77 (1977). One of the greatest
fears of attorney advertising is its alleged capacity to commercialize the legal arena. See id.
at 368. Such commercialization, it has been argued, necessarily decreases the dignity at-
tached to and inherent in the "professional milieu." See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and
the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1184 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Advertising, Solicitation]. More specifically, advertising en-
hances a lawyer's commercial need to earn, and thereby undermines the public's impression
of an attorney as one who is idealistically committed to societal welfare. See Bates, 433 U.S.
at 368; Note, Advertising, Solicitation, supra, at 1184. A second objection to attorney adver-
tising is the less persuasive argument that such solicitation is inherently misleading. See
Bates, 433 U.S. at 372; cf. Note, Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 182, 187-88 (1955)
(an attorney who "chases ambulances" is usually prone to formulating or exaggerating
claims). It is contended that advertising by attorneys is misleading, since it is self-serving,
see B. CHuSTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 140 (1970), and that the
advertised facts are usually highly irrelevant and immaterial, see Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
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warranted.2 Notwithstanding this approval, the Supreme Court has
given little guidance as to the types of advertising restraints that
are constitutionally permissible.' Moreover, states have revised
their codes of ethics to permit only a minimum of advertising.4
Thus the type and degree of permissible attorney advertising have
remained uncertain. In re R.M.J.,5 the Supreme Court's most re-
cent pronouncement in this area and an outgrowth of earlier cases
extending first amendment protection to commercial speech, to a
large extent settles this uncertainty by clarifying the degree of con-
stitutional protection to be afforded advertising by attorneys.
This Article seeks to place in their contemporary perspective
the constitutional concepts of commercial speech and lawyer ad-
vertising. Accordingly, the Article will trace the development of
constitutional treatment of commercial speech, and review the
commercial speech concept as it has been applied to attorney ad-
vertising. Thereafter, an analysis of In re R.M.J. will be under-
taken, with a view toward both its theoretical and its practical
implications.
2 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); see infra notes 56-65 and
accompanying text. See generally Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The First Amendment
Challenge to State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
585, 585-87 (1978).
3 The uncertain boundaries of permissible lawyer advertising have been attributed to
the Supreme Court's hesitation to delineate specifically the constitutional prescriptions by
which- the states must abide when regulating commercial speech. See, e.g., Boden, Five
Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and Ethical Perspective, 65 MARQ. L. REV.
547, 554 (1982). In fact, establishing a specific level of post-Bates permissible attorney ad-
vertising has been labeled an "insurmountable task." Welch, supra note 2, at 612.
4 See L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 43
(1980). Andrews observes that many state regulations seem designed to discourage advertis-
ing rather than to promote it. Id. She notes that in 26 states the rules are so restrictive that
even the advertisement in Bates would not be permissible. Id. The American Bar Associa-
tion's immediate acceptance of Bates has been described as "grudging at best." Shadur, The
Impact of Advertising and Specialization on Professional Responsibility, 61 CHI. B. REC.
324, 325 (1980). Shadur -notes:
When a post-Bates ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising produced two alterna-
tive proposals, the ABA's Board of Governors approved the more restrictive one.
Even if that version could withstand constitutional scrutiny, it certainly is not
openly responsive to the public's interest in the full, free flow of information, as
expressed by the Supreme Court.
Id.
, 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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I. THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. The Conceptual Sources for Protecting Freedom of Expres-
sion
Any discussion of the historical development of the commer-
cial speech concept should commence with a recognition and un-
derstanding of the two conceptual bases for protecting freedom of
expression-the right to expression and the right to know. Com-
mentators have regarded the right to expression as the more im-
portant of these conceptual bases, since expression lies at the heart
of human individuality.7 The right to express oneself, therefore, is
construed to protect "all speech that has as its source an
individual."8
The source of protection for the "speech" of business enter-
prises, on the other hand, has been perceived as rooted solely in
the individual's right to know.9 Although the right to know, in con-
6 See Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term Foreward: Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 HAnv. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1980). Professor Cox maintains that man "can expe-
rience no greater affront to ... [his] humanity than denial of freedom of expression." Id. at
1. Similarly, Cox believes that "[t]he hearer and reader suffer a violation of their spiritual
liberty if they are denied access to the ideas of others." Id.; see Emerson, Toward A General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Emerson, General Theory]. In the context of individual self-realization, man's potential can
only be achieved through development of the mind. Emerson, General Theory, supra, at
879. With the resulting right to form beliefs and opinions came "the right to express these
beliefs and opinions." Id. Since no foreseeable limit can or should be placed on this process
of thought and development of ideas, any suppression is deemed an intolerable burden on
man's struggle to become a "free and knowing" individual. Id. at 880. Consequently, censor-
ing the mind by infringing upon freedom of expression impedes man's mental exploration
and intellectual development. Id. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 88-125
(1960).
7 See Comment, Commercial Speech and the Limits of Legal Advertising, 58 OR. L.
REV. 193, 206 (1979). One commentator poignantly stated:
The need to express, as distinguished from the need to impart information, is a
peculiarly human requirement. Expression is a requisite to human dignity, and
therefore it must be pursued along whatever path conscience dictates. People
must be true to themselves, and our society strives to allow this. Yet expression
which is true to self at times transcends the bounds of social utility. Therefore, by
its very terms, the right of expression can only be understood as a right of the
individual, for businesses are of value only insofar as they contribute to social
utility.
Id.
8 Id. (emphasis in original); see Emerson, General Theory, supra note 6, at 878.
9 Comment, supra note 7, at 207. It has been argued that the only first amendment
protection to which businesses are entitled is "that which is derived from the people's right
to hear their speech." Id.; see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). In
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trast to the right to expression, does not contribute to individual
self-realization, 10 it nevertheless is essential to the effective opera-
tion of the "marketplace of ideas. '1 Thus, even though the right
to know generally will yield less protection than the right to ex-
pression, 2 an independent protection for the right to know has
been regarded as necessary when a speaker cannot enforce his right
to communicate.13 To be sure, the right to know protects idea-
laden speech, regardless of its source.' 4 It is interesting that at
least one commentator has argued that the right to know should be
considered as important as the right to express oneself.15
Bellotti, a Massachusetts statute prohibited corporations from making contributions or ex-
penditures for the purpose of influencing voters on questions contained in State referenda.
435 U.S. at 767-68. Massachusetts justified this prohibition by claiming that a first amend-
ment right is extended to corporations only when a political issue has a material effect on its
business or property. Id. at 771. Declining to differentiate between the value of corporate
and individual speech, id. at 777, the Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that
it reflected too narrow an understanding of the purpose behind the first amendment, id. at
784. The Court stated that "[t]he speech proposed by [the corporations] is at the heart of
the First Amendment's protection," id. at 776, but added that "we need not survey the
outer boundaries of the Amendment's protection of corporate speech. . .", id. at 777. In so
holding, the Court relied upon both freedom-of-press and commercial-speech precedent. Id.
at 782-83; see, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969) ("[ilt is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas"). The
Bellotti Court found the identity of the speaker, a corporation, to be irrelevant: "The inher-
ent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
10 Comment, supra note 7, at 208-09. Purely commercial speech was perceived as serv-
ing not the person, but the business entity. See id.; Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem
in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. Rav. 1, 12-15 (1976). Hence, it was regarded as
merely profit oriented, and thus not worthy of constitutional protection. Baker, supra, at
12-15; see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
11 See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 4
[hereinafter cited as Emerson, Legal Foundations].
12 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting);
Comment, supra note 7, at 209-10, 209 n.93. Justice White asserted that "[ildeas which are
not a product of individual choice are entitled to less first amendment protection." 435 U.S.
at 807 (White, J., dissenting). Hence, "[s]ince the right to know protects communications
that are not the product of individual belief. . . " such a right will not yield the extensive
protection accorded the right to expression. Comment, supra note 7, at 209.
IS Emerson, Legal Foundqtions, supra note 11, at 4.
" Comment, supra note 7, at 206; see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978). The value of speech to informed decisionmaking "does not depend upon the identity
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." 435 U.S. at 777.
" See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 256.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not accorded the right to know the same
status as the right to expression, it certainly has attributed independent significance to the
concept: "[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expres-
sion of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
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B. The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized the limited
power of states and municipalities to regulate communication of
information and dissemination of opinion in public places.11 With
respect to "purely commercial" advertising, however, the Court ini-
tially found no equivalent constitutional restraint.17 Indeed, the
Supreme Court determined that the permissible scope of business
advocacy was wholly subject to the dictates of the governing legis-
lative body.18 Despite this initial proclamation of an ostensibly un-
limited right of the states to regulate commercial advertising, it
appears that the Court never provided any authority for legislative
curbing of purely commercial speech in the absence of some com-
peting public interest.
The analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in evaluating
legislative restrictions upon commercial speech indicates why the
vitality of not according such advertising constitutional protection
persisted for some time. With respect to individual speech, the
Court seems to have focused primarily upon the individual's free-
which members of the public may draw." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978).
is See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S: 52, 54 (1942); L. TRmE, AmERCAN CON-
sTrrUTIONAL LAW § 12-21, at 689 (1978). It has been indicated that the states may not "un-
duly burden" the communication of information or the dissemination of opinion in public
thoroughfares. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. Generally, the only time a government can regu-
late or prohibit either speech or speech-related conduct in such places is when the regula-
tion or prohibition is "necessary to serve significant governmental interests." L. TRIE,
supra, § 12-21, at 689.
17 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942). Valentine was the first case
to render commercial speech subordinate to other types of speech. That case involved an
attempt by a submarine owner to distribute handbills advertising the exhibition of his sub-
marine. Id. at 52-53. He was advised by the police that such activity would violate the appli-
cable handbill ordinance. Id. The Court upheld the ordinance against him by reasoning that
the limitations on states and inunicipalities to regulate the free communication of informa-
tion and opinion are not applicable when the speech in question is "purely commercial ad-
vertising." Id. at 54-55.
Is Id. at 54. After distinguishing commercial speech from other types of speech, the
Valentine Court stated:
Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in
the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the
public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment. The question is not
whether the legislative body may interfere with the harmless pursuit of a lawful
business, but whether it must permit such pursuit by what it deems an undesir-
able invasion of, or interference with, the full and free use of the highways by the
people in fulfillment of the public use to which streets are dedicated.
Id. at 54-55.
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dom of expression's in striking the balance between the commu-
nity's right to regulate time, place and manner of distribution on
the one hand, and the individual's right to expression on the
other.20 When examining restrictions imposed upon commercial
speech, however, the Court has used a content-based distinction
that subordinates commercial speech to other types of speech for
purposes of assessing the validity of time, place and manner limi-
tations. 21 The first case to recognize and adopt this distinction was
Breard v. City of Alexandria.22 In Breard, an ordinance excluding
uninvited solicitors of magazine subscriptions from private resi-
dences was upheld.2 3 In adopting this content-based distinction,
the Court apparently considered the form of communication in-
volved as merely an alternative method of conducting business
rather than as a form of speech.24
The Breard content-based analysis was followed in later cases
19 The Court's focus on the individual's freedom of expression is obvious from its many
references to "dissemination of ideas," "espousing various causes," "dissemination of opin-
ion," and "freedom to distribute information." See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 145-46 (1943).
20 See, e.g., id. at 143. In Martin, an ordinance forbidding door-to-door distribution of
handbills advertising a religious meeting was held unconstitutional. Id. at 149. The Supreme
Court of Ohio dismissed an appeal on the ground that a sufficient constitutional question
was lacking. Id. at 142 n.2. The United States Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal,
stating that "no constitutional question had been properly raised in accordance with Ohio
procedure." Id. Upon reconsideration, however, the Court addressed the substantive ele-
ments of the case, stating: "We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing
the conflicting interests of the appellant in the civil rights she claims, as well as the right of
the individual householder to determine whether he is willing to receive her message ....
Id. at 143.
21 See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951).
22 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
13 Id. at 645. The appellant, Jack Breard, was employed by Keystone Readers Service,
Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation. Id. at 624. Breard was arrested for soliciting magazine
subscriptions from owners and occupants of private dwellings. Id. The trial court convicted
Breard of violating the local ordinance and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Id. at
625. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Louisiana court. Id. at 645.
24 See id. at 644. The treatment of the form of communication as an alternative method
of conducting business is implicit in the balancing test employed by the Court: "[TJhe con-
stitutionality of Alexandria's ordinance turn[s] upon a balancing of the conveniences be-
tween some householders' desire for privacy and the publisher's right to distribute publica-
tions in the precise way that those soliciting for him think brings the best results." Id.
Dissenting, Justice Black professed that the first amendment "bars laws like the present
ordinance which punish persons who peacefully go from door to door as agents of the press."
Id. at 650 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). At the same time, however, Justice
Black supported a content-based restriction on commercial speech by stating that the "ordi-
nance could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant' who goes from door to door 'selling
pots.'" Id. at 650 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting).
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in which the challenged advertisements conveyed information re-
lating to vital public issues. 25 For example, in Bigelow v. Virginia,26
a Virginia newspaper editor who had published a New York organ-
ization's abortion referral service advertisement was convicted of
violating a Virginia statute which prohibited publications encour-
aging the procuring of abortions. 1 Upon review of that decision,
the Supreme Court disregarded the label affixed to the challenged
speech-be it commercial or otherwise-and subjectively elected to
utilize a balancing test to determine the constitutionality of the
statute.28 The analytical framework employed by the Court in-
volved weighing the alleged first amendment interest at stake
against the public interest that the regulation purportedly served.29
21 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). In .Sullivan, L.B. Sullivan, one of three commissioners of
Montgomery, Alabama, with supervisory duties over the Police Department, brought a libel
action against four Alabama clergymen and the New York Times. 376 U.S. at 256. The
alleged libel was contained in a paid advertisement published in the New York Times on
March 29, 1960. Id. The advertisement elicited support for the defense of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and for the civil rights movement. Id. at 256-57. Although Sullivan was not men-
tioned by name, the advertisement discussed the violent acts of the Montgomery police. Id.
at 257-58. A jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 in damages and the Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed. Id. at 256. In reversing the Alabama court, the United States Supreme Court held
that Sullivan's evidence failed to support a finding of "actual malice," and thus could not
support the judgment. Id. at 285-86.
Although the communication was in the form of a paid advertisement soliciting funds
on behalf of the civil rights movement, the Court characterized it "as an expression of griev-
ance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time." Id. at 271. Accordingly, it
was not difficult for the Court to conclude that the advertisement was not a "commercial"
advertisement, see id. at 266, but rather, it was a manifestation of "freedom of expression
upon public questions," id. at 269, which retains its constitutional protection notwithstand-
ing that it appears in an advertisement, id. at 271; see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973); infra note 29.
26 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
27 Id. at 811-12. The Virginia statute provides: "If any person, by publication, lecture,
advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner,
encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor." VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1960) (current version at VA. CODE § 18.2-76.1 (1975)); see 421
U.S. at 812-13. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's conviction of the
defendant, reasoning that the first amendment does not prohibit states from regulating
commercial advertising. Bigelow v. Virginia, 213 Va. 191, 195, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1972),
rev'd, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). While this statement of law was correct, the Virginia court's
determination was nevertheless found to be erroneous since the advertisement in question
"contained factual material of clear 'public interest'." 421 U.S. at 822. The advertisement
contained the statements: "Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency
requirements." Id. The Supreme Court regarded this advertisement as involving "the exer-
cise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion." Id.
28 421 U.S. at 826.
29 Id. The Bigelow Court stated:
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Due to the serious first amendment overtones resulting from the
defendant's position as an editor and publisher of a newspaper °
and the constitutional interests of the general public in the factual
material contained in the advertisement, the Court found the first
amendment interests to be substantial.31 Conversely, the Court
considered the asserted legitimate state interest to be of questiona-
ble import.3 2 Hence, the Court concluded that, as applied to the
defendant, the statute infringed upon constitutionally protected
speech.33
Although the Bigelow emphasis on the right-to-know principle
has been interpreted as initiating the demise of commercial speech
as a constitutionally unprotected activity,3 4 the Court's opinion, in
actuality, left unanswered the question of the extent to which first
amendment protection might be afforded purely commercial solici-
tation not arguably within the realm of the "marketplace of
ideas."' 5 In fact, reviewing Bigelow and its predecessors reveals
that the Court was making ad hoc determinations based princi-
The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant's newspaper had com-
mercial aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests did not negate all
First Amendment guarantees. The State was not free of constitutional restraint
merely because the advertisement involved sales or 'solicitations,' . . . or because
appellant was paid for printing it,. . . or because appellant's motive or the motive
of the advertiser may have involved financial gain ....
Id. at 818 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the Virginia courts failed to bal-
ance the first amendment interests with those of the State. Id. at 825.
11 Id. at 828. By underscoring that the defendant was an editor of a newspaper, the
decision raises questions as to what the outcome of identical litigation against the adver-
tiser, referral agency or practitioner might have been. Id. The Supreme Court intimated
that less first amendment protection would be afforded these groups should such litigation
arise. See id.
31 Id. at 822.
31 See id. at 827-28. The advertisement (1) did not affect the quality of medical services
within Virginia, (2) did not relate to a commodity or service then illegal in either New York
or Virginia, (3) was not deceptive or fraudulent, (4) did not further a criminal scheme in
Virginia, and (5) would not invade the privacy of citizens or infringe on other rights. Id. at
828. The Bigelow Court concluded that Virginia's interest in shielding its citizens from in-
formation concerning services not within the purview of Virginia's police powers "was enti-
tled to little, if any, weight under the circumstances." Id. Justice Rehnquist, however, sug-
gested that a legitimate public interest in the regulation, as asserted by the Supreme Court
of Virginia, did indeed exist: "the prevention of commercial exploitation of those women
who elect to have an abortion." Id. at 832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Bigelow, 213 Va. at
196, 191 S.E.2d at 176.
" 421 U.S. at 829.
34 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 196.
"I See 421 U.S. at 826.
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pally upon the respective content of the messages under attack.",
While the ramifications of Bigelow for general commercial adver-
tising have been viewed as favorable, the Court's own observation
that the decision was not inconsistent with earlier cases involving
the regulation of professional activity made the implications of
Bigelow for advertising by professionals quite perplexing.3
A later case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,3" presented issues of both the
protection of purely commercial speech and the regulation of pro-
fessionals. In Virginia Pharmacy, a consumer group challenged a
state statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription
drug rates. 9 The Court posed the question whether "speech which
does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'" categori-
cally is excluded from first amendment protection.40 Answering in
the negative, the Court relied heavily upon the right-to-know prin-
ciple.41 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, reasoned that a
particular consumer's interest in maintaining easy access to com-
mercial information may be as great as, if not greater than, his
30 See id. Justice Rehnquist criticized the practice of resolving each case based on the
content of the advertisements, stating: "If the Court's decision does, indeed, turn upon its
conclusion that the advertisement ... was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the subject of the advertisement ought to make no difference." Id. at 831 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). One commentator has postulated that where commercial advertising is dis-
similar to fully protected speech, it should not be given full protection but should be "gov-
erned by the principle that a regulatory law is constitutional if it can reasonably be sup-
posed to contribute to the effectuation of some rational view of the public interest." Cox,
supra note 6, at 27.
37 421 U.S. at 825 n.10; see Whitman, Advertising by Professionals, 16 Am. Bus. L.J.
39, 53 (1978). After extending first amendment protection to the plaintiff's advertise-
ment-apparently expanding the applicability of the free-speech doctrine to include com-
mercial advertising-the Court stated that its "decision ... is in no way inconsistent with
[its] holdings in the Fourteenth Amendment cases that concern the regulation of profes-
sional activity." 421 U.S. at 825 n.10.
38 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
39 Id. at 749-50.
40 Id. at 762. The Court questioned whether purely commercial speech "is so removed
from any 'exposition of ideas,'. . . and from 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in
its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,' that it is to go
completely unprotected." Id. (citations omitted).
41 Id. at 769-70. The right-to-know aspect of the first amendment was discussed and
confirmed in Virginia Pharmacy, which involved a group of consumers seeking access to
information barred by the governing regulation. Id. at 763-65. The statute had previously
been scrutinized in Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969), in
which the court held that the statutory provision aimed at advertising prices and terms of
sale of prescription drugs was valid, but that such a statute could not be used to prohibit
the fixing of prescription drug prices. Id. at 827.
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interest in current political events, and that society in general may
also have a keen interest in free access to commercial informa-
tion.42 In fact, employing the reasoning historically undertaken to
protect the right to an informed electoral or political choice, the
Court concluded that in order for consumers to determine what is
in their best interests, they need fully to be apprised of all relevant
facts.43 Of particular import to the Court's decision were the needs
of the poor, sick, and aged."
Balanced against this personal and societal right-to-know was
Virginia's strong interest in upholding a high level of professional-
ism among pharmacists. 45  Recognizing this interest, the Court
stated that the government could prescribe whatever professional
standards it desired, but not at the expense of keeping the public
unapprised of the competing terms offered by different pharma-
cists. 46 By observing that the state interests allegedly advanced by
4 425 U.S. at 763-64. The Court surmised that since the free flow of commercial infor-
mation is essential to the proper allocation of resources in a free-market system, this stream
of information is also essential in formulating an intelligent opinion as to the.proper regula-
tion of that system. Thus, the free flow of information serves the goal of "enlighten[ing]
public decisionmaking in a democracy." Id. at 765 (footnote omitted). The logic of the above
analysis in making the free operation of the market an element of first amendment doctrine
has not gone without criticism. See Cox, supra note 6, at 28. Cox has stated that "[t]he
philosophical and political foundations of first amendment doctrine scarcely extend to an
offer to enter into a private commercial transaction." Id. at 27; see Jackson & Jeffries, Com-
mercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-6
(1979).
43 425 U.S. at 770. Justice Blackmun asserted that the choice between alternative ap-
proaches was left neither to the Court nor to the legislature, stating that "[i]t is precisely
this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its
misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes . . . ... Id.
44 Id. at 763. The Court observed that the poor, the sick and the aged were the least
capable of bearing the consequences of a proscription on information regarding the price of
drugs. Id. The aged, in particular, suffer a "diminished capacity. . . for the kind of active
comparison shopping that a ban on advertising makes necessary ... " Id. at 763 n.18.
Citing various figures derived from a number of publications, the Court noted that the eld-
erly expend more than twice the amount of money that other age groups spend on medical
supplies. Id. Moreover, the aged are commonly stricken with chronic conditions and suffer
diminished resources. Id. Thus, "information as to who is charging what becomes more than
a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic ne-
cessities." Id. at 764.
45 Id. at 766. The Court noted that maintaining the standards of professionalism among
pharmacists can benefit consumers in many ways. Id. For example, the Court observed that
where a physician has failed to indicate the quantity of drugs to be dispensed, the pharma-
cist's skill will augment that of the physician. Id. at 767.
46 Id. at 770. Justice Blackmun stated that the Court would not follow the "highly pa-
ternalistic approach" of shielding consumers from pharmacist advertising of prices. Id. In-
stead, the Court posited that consumers will act in their own best interest if they have the
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the challenged regulation already were guaranteed to a substantial
degree by the existing state regulations,47 the Court revealed that
its holding was essentially an application of a least restrictive alter-
native theory.48 Under such an analysis, the only restrictions sanc-
tioned by the Court for regulating commercial speech were: (1) rea-
sonable time, place and manner restrictions,49 (2) prohibitions on
requisite knowledge about the product in question, and the best method to achieve this
objective is to "open the channels of communication." Id.
47 Id. at 768.
48 Id. at 770. The Court applied a test similar to the least restrictive alternative theory
in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), in determining
whether the township of Willingboro could adopt an ordinance which prohibited the posting
of real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs. Id. at 86. The basic rationale for adopting the
ordinance had been to curb panic selling by white homeowners. Id. at 88. Testimony at trial
had indicated that such signs had exacerbated this panic, id., and that racial fervor had
subsided following the adoption of the ordinance, id. at 90. In response to an action seeking
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the district court had declared the ordinance
unconstitutional, but the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 86-87. The township argued that
although the ordinance limited commercial speech, speakers and listeners had a lesser first
amendment interest in this form of speech than did the parties in Bigelow and Virginia
Pharmacy. Id.
49 425 U.S. at 771. Several conditions were placed on the imposition of time, place and
manner restrictions. First, they must not be content based. Id. Second, they must "serve a
significant governmental interest." Id. Finally, the restrictions must leave open adequate
alternatives for disseminating the information. Id. The Court's insistence that the regulation
be blind to content is somewhat questionable, given its observation that "[i]f there is a kind
of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection . . . it must be distin-
guished by its content." Id. at 761. Although the Court held that commercial speech is not
wholly denied protection under the first amendment, it did not grant commercial speech the
level of protection afforded other varieties of speech. Id. at 771 n.24. Fundamental differ-
ences between commercial speech and other types of speech cause uncertainty because the
distinction appears to be based on differences in content. The complications posed by such
content-based distinctions are amply illustrated in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490 (1981) and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See
Cox, supra note 6, at 26-31; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 93, 211-21
(1981).
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, a divided Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Detroit zoning ordinance which prohibited the operation of an adult theater "within 1,000
feet of any two other 'regulated uses' or within 500 feet of a residential area." 427 U.S. at 52.
The ordinance differentiated between theaters exhibiting sexually explicit films and those
which did not. Id. at 53. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens stated that the "city's
interest in planning and regulating the use of property for commercial purposes is clearly
adequate to support [the zoning restriction]." Id. at 62-63. Justice Stevens' prognosis that
the level of first amendment protection to be given commercial speech in the future will be
determined by its content, id. at 68-69, however, was supported by only three other mem-
bers of the Court, see id. at 51.
The problems in this area were unresolved by Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, in
which the Court was unable to reach a position satisfactory to a majority. In Metromedia,
the plurality struck down a San Diego ordinance banning most billboard advertising. 453
U.S. at 493-96, 521. The plurality concluded that the city could not allow some forms of
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advertising which might in any way be false or misleading, 50 and
(3) restrictions on advertisements promoting illegal transactions.51
Since the case specifically involved product advertising by pharma-
cists, however, the extent and limitations of the first amendment
protection and the types of speech covered remained somewhat
speculative.2 For example, specifically left unanswered by the
Court was the status of advertising for professional services, an
area where the possibility of deception is inherently high.5 3 Vir-
ginia Pharmacy thus remained an enigmatic decision and commer-
cial speech as "an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking
in a democracy," continued to evade precise definition. 4
III. LAWYER ADVERTISING
Shortly after the Virginia Pharmacy decision was rendered, 55
noncommercial advertising while prohibiting others. Id. at 514-15. At the same time, the
Court left unanswered the question whether a total ban of outdoor advertising would violate
the first amendment. Id. at 515 n.20.
50 425 U.S. at 771.
81 Id. at 772.
52 Id. at 773 n.25. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that Vir-
ginia Pharmacy addressed the advertisement of standardized products, rather than profes-
sional services. Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice posited that advertis-
ing by certain professionals may be "inherently misleading," because the services required
by each individual client or patient will differ. Id. at 775 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
13 Id. at 773 n.25. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court noted that professional services,
unlike certain products, are not subject to standardization. Id. Since these services are of an
"almost infinite variety and nature," there is a reduced possibility of formulating an arche-
typal model and thus an enhanced danger of confusion and deception. See id. This risk of
deception is further enhanced when the advertisement contains information concerning the
quality of legal services or includes standardized price listings for complex legal services. See
Bates, 433 U.S. at 366, 372. Thus, "because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertis-
ing may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising." Id. at 383 (footnote omitted).
8- 425 U.S. at 765. By failing to delineate the scope of the nascent protection of com-
mercial speech, the Court relegated the applicability of Virginia Pharmacy to future
interpretation.
8 Subsequent to Virginia Pharmacy, the Court had two opportunities to expand the
commercial speech doctrine. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). For a discussion of
Linmark, see supra note 48. Carey, decided during the same term as Linmark, involved a
challenge to a New York statute prohibiting, inter alia, the advertisement or display of
contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 681. The statute contained more than merely a time, place or
manner restriction; it was a content-based prohibition of information regarding "the availa-
bility of products and services that are not only entirely legal. . . but [are] constitutionally
protected." Id. at 701 (citation omitted). The Court held that the potentially offensive and
inciteful nature of these advertisements were insufficient to justify total suppression, id. at
701-02, and thereby expanded commercial speech protection to a wider variety of
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the Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 6 had the
opportunity to address unequivocally the propriety of an advertise-
ment solely for professional services. In Bates, two attorneys had
advertised their "legal clinic" in a local newspaper,57 identifying
several routine legal services that their clinic offered and stating
the fees to be charged.58 Although conceding that they had violated
Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), which prohibited lawyer advertising
through any medium, 59 the attorneys contended that the discipli-
nary rule was violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act e0 and in-
advertisement.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
57 Id. at 354. The attorneys in Bates sought to provide legal services to people of mod-
erate means by accepting only simple legal matters and by making extensive use of parale-
gals. Id. A substantial volume of cases was therefore imperative to insure low fees. Id. In
order to sustain their practices, the attorneys were compelled to advertise. Id.; see Welch,
supra note 2, at 585-86.
18 433 U.S. at 385. The Bates advertisement appeared as follows:
Divorce or legal separation-uncontested
[both spouses sign papers]
$175.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
Preparation of all court papers and instructions on how to do your
own simple uncontested divorce
$100.00
Adoption-uncontested severance proceeding
$225.00 plus approximately $10.00 publication cost
Bankruptcy-non-business, no contested proceedings
Individual
$225.00 plus $55.00 court filing fee
Wife and Husband
$300.00 plus $110.00 court filing fee
Change of Name
$95.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
Id. Additionally, the advertisement stated that information regarding other types of cases
would be furnished upon request. Id.
Shortly after the advertisement appeared in the local newspaper, the clinic experienced
an increase in clientele. Id. at 354 n.4. It was unclear, however, whether the increase was
attributable to the advertisement or was merely a result of subsequent publicity. Id.
59 Id. at 355; see Comment, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: A Consumers' Rights Inter-
pretation of the First Amendment Ends Ban on Legal Advertising, 55 DEN. L. J. 103, 103
(1978). The Arizona disciplinary rule provided that "[a] lawyer shall not publicize himself
... as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television an-
nouncements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of
commercial publicity .... " ARiz. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 2-101(B)
(1976).
60 Bates, 433 U.S. at 356. The attorneys argued that since the disciplinary rule tended
to limit competition, it violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1, 2 (1976). 433 U.S. at 356. The Court, however, summarily dismissed this claim, relying on
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), in which certain state actions were exempted from the
Sherman Act. 433 U.S. at 359, 363. See generally L. ANDREwS, supra note 4, at 3-6.
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fringed upon their first amendment rights.6 1 The Arizona Bar As-
sociation, on the other hand, advanced numerous grounds for
sustaining the disciplinary regulation, including the adverse effects
of advertising on professionalism and the administration of jus-
tice."2 Addressing itself solely to the issue of whether a state con-
stitutionally may prohibit newspaper advertising of fees charged
for "routine legal services,"63 the Court concluded that the public's
need for information concerning the availability and terms of legal
services outweighed the alleged detrimental effects of such adver-
tising.64 The Court observed that the advertising restriction actu-
ally contravened, rather than advanced, some of the arguments of
the Arizona Bar.65
The Bates decision constituted a broad expansion of constitu-
tional protection to the highly controversial area of attorney adver-
tising.6 Prohibitions on advertising by lawyers, once untouchable
el 433 U.S. at 356.
62 Id. at 368-77. In addition to asserting the adverse effects of advertising as grounds
for sustaining the disciplinary regulation on professionalism and the administration of jus-
tice, the Arizona Bar argued that attorney advertising was inherently misleading, had unde-
sirable economic effects, id. at 372-75, adversely affected the quality of legal services, id. at
378-79, and would prove difficult to regulate, id. at 379. See Boden, supra note 3, at 553;
Welch, supra note 2, at 596-98.
63 See 433 U.S. at 367. The Court stated that "the heart of the dispute before us today
is whether lawyers also may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain services
will be performed." Id. at 367-68 (emphasis in original); see Welch, supra note 2, at 595-96.
64 See 433 U.S. at 379. The Court exclaimed that no justification espoused by the Ari-
zona Bar Association ascended to "an acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertis-
ing by attorneys." Id. In discussing the public's need for information regarding the availabil-
ity and terms of legal services, the Court articulated three general principles: the public has
the right to make an informed, intelligent choice concerning legal counsel, id. at 365, 377;
the legal profession suffers from an adverse public image, which may be due in part to the
belief that attorney's fees are too high, id.; and advertising may reduce prices, and thus will
promote the use of legal counsel among the middle class, id. at 377. L. ANDREWS, supra note
4, at 4-5.
65 433 U.S. at 372-79. Contrary to the contention that advertising will adversely affect
legal professionalism, the Court opined that lawyer advertising actually may have a positive
impact on professionalism. Id. at 368-71. This stems from the suggestion that the refusal of
lawyers to advertise has exacerbated public cynicism toward the profession. Id. at 370-71.
Additionally, the Court rejected as dubious the argument that advertising will increase fees
charged, reasoning that the competition resulting from advertising may instead serve to
lower rates. Id. at 377-78; see Welch, supra note 2, at 595-98.
66 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court noted that its holding did not extend to the adver-
tising of professional services. See 425 U.S. at 768. Additionally, neither Carey nor Linmark
represented theoretical expansions of commercial speech protection beyond the limits of
Virginia Pharmacy. See supra notes 48 & 55. Thus, until Bates, the extent to which the
Court would protect the advertising of professionals remained unclear.
Bates, by permitting lawyer advertising, rejected the arguments that such advertising
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within the sanctuary of attorney professionalism, for the first time
were discredited by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, a number of
aspects of the Bates holding serve to lessen the decision's impact.1
7
First, by virtue of the conspicuously narrow nature of the
Bates holding, 8 the constitutional permissibility of advertising
other than routine legal services remained speculative. Indeed,
problems surrounding advertisements which relate to the quality
of legal services as well as questions concerning in-person solicita-
tion were left unanswered. This hesitancy to afford meaningful
protection to more profound attorney advertising is somewhat puz-
zling, since the Court itself noted that the lack of advertising bred
"disillusionment with the profession. "70
In addition, the Bates Court enunciated a number of permissi-
ble restrictions, 1 including those set forth in Virginia Pharmacy:
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and restraints on
was somehow unethical. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 371-72. Legal advertising, previously consid-
ered inherently inconsistent with the ethics of the profession, was rendered equivalent to
purely economic commercial speech. Although Bates did not add doctrinally to commercial
speech, it should be viewed as the preamble to the Court's subsequent elaboration of the
commercial speech theory.
" See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
"8 See 433 U.S. at 383-84; supra note 63 and accompanying text. By restricting its hold-
ing to advertisements of routine legal services, the Bates Court appears to have applied the
"standardized products" rationale of Virginia Pharmacy. Thus, it seems that the Bates
Court has likened the advertising of routine legal services to the commercialization of
"prepackaged drugs." See 433 U.S. at 391 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
69 433 U.S. at 366. The Court expressly reserved ruling on advertisements relating
to the quality of legal services and those concerning in-person solicitation, stating:
"[A]dvertising claims as to the quality of services. . . are not susceptible of measurement or
verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restric-
tion. Similar objections might justify restraints on in-person solicitation." Id. at 383-84. It
should be noted that the Court subsequently addressed the solicitation issue, see infra notes
75-95, but still has not addressed the "quality" issue.
71 433 U.S. at 370 (footnote omitted). The low esteem with which the public held the
bar prior to the Court's sanctioning of lawyer advertising would tend to refute the argument
that such advertising would have damaging repercussions upon the dignity of the profession.
See Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications
of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 475, 516 & n.221 (1977). Indeed, "dissatisfaction with the
bar stems in major part from the aloofness of lawyers and their failure to reach out to the
community." Id. at 516. There is an implicit contradiction in the legal profession's denunci-
ation of advertising and its condonation of the avid structuring of social and civic engage-
ments to broaden an attorney's potential client base. See 433 U.S. at 370-71.
7, 433 U.S. at 383. By mentioning only "some of the clearly permissible limitations on
advertising" by attorneys, the Court implied the existence of other possible regulations. Id.
(emphasis supplied). No clue was provided, however, with respect to what these other possi-
ble restrictions might be. See id.
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false, deceptive or misleading advertising.7 The Court thus made
the permissible restrictions on general commercial speech applica-
ble to lawyer advertising."3 The Bates decision, therefore, while ex-
emplifying the ever-increasing nature of commercial speech protec-
tion, rests uncomfortably on the same ad hoc foundation as
previous commercial speech cases.7 4
Subsequent to Bates, the Supreme Court considered the regu-
lation of direct solicitation by attorneys."5 In re Primus7 6 con-
cerned an attorney, Edna Smith Primus, who was associated with
both a private law firm and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU)Y7 In 1973, the ACLU initiated a program to commence
actions on behalf of any person sterilized as a condition of a state
medical program.78 Upon learning that a victim, Mary Williams,
was willing to commence such a suit, Primus wrote the woman in-
forming her of the ACLU's offer of free legal representation. 9
Shortly thereafter, Williams responded by informing the attorney
of her intention not to sue.80 As a result of the written communica-
tion to the victim, however, Primus was charged with violating the
State's disciplinary rule prohibiting solicitation of clients.81 Despite
72 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
73 433 U.S. at 383-84.
74 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
75 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436 U.S. 447
(1978).
76 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
7 Id. at 414. Primus did not receive remuneration from the ACLU, but was paid a
retainer fee by the South Carolina Council on Human Relations. Id. at 414-15.
78 Id. at 415-16. Mothers receiving Medicaid were informed that sterilization was a pre-
condition for remaining on the program. Id. at 415. Consequently, several sterilizations were
performed. See id. As a representative of the South Carolina Council on Human Relations,
Primus addressed a group of women who allegedly had been sterilized under the program.
Id. at 415-16. During the meeting, Primus informed the women of their legal rights and
"suggested the possibility of a lawsuit." Id. at 416. Shortly thereafter, Primus was willing to
represent these women on behalf of the ACLU. Id.
79 Id. The letter stated in part: "The American Civil Liberties Union would like to file a
lawsuit on your behalf for money against the doctor who performed the operation .... [I]f
you are interested, let me know. . . ." Id. at 416 n.6.
80 Id. at 417. The victim telephoned Primus to reject the offer of free legal counsel. Id.
Prior to telephoning the attorney, the victim visited the doctor who performed the steriliza-
tion and signed a document releasing him from liability. Id. There was no further communi-
cation between the victim and Primus. Id.
81 Id. at 418; see S.C. CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL RESFONSmILrry DR 2-103(D)(5)(C), DR 2-
104(A)(5) (1973). A complaint against the attorney was filed with the Board of Commission-
ers on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board). 436 U.S.
at 417. A board-appointed panel determined that the lawyer had solicited a client on behalf
of the ACLU in violation of the disciplinary rules. Id. at 418. At the hearing, the atiorney
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Primus' contentions that her activity was constitutionally pro-
tected s2 she was publicly reprimanded by the state's highest
court.83
On appeal, the Supreme Court, rather than relying upon any
of the previously discussed cases, held the rule in NAACP v. But-
ton"4 to be dispositive s5 In Button, the Court had ruled that the
litigation assistance offered by the NAACP was a form of political
expression and association, fully protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments.8 6 Since the Primus Court determined that the
ACLU engaged in activities similar to those of the NAACP in But-
ton, it concluded that Primus' conduct was likewise protected.8 7
Notably, the Court indicated that states may regulate in-person so-
licitation, distinguishing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,s"
offered to produce expert testimony that some degree of solicitation is necessary to protect
the "liberties of inarticulate, economically disadvantaged" persons who may be unaware of
their rights and the availability of counsel. Id. at 418 n.9. This offer was "rejected as not
germane to the disciplinary hearing." Id.
82 436 U.S. at 417. The attorney argued that her activity was protected under the first
and fourteenth amendments, as well as under Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. Id.
81 Id. at 421.
84 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
82 See 436 U.S. at 426-31.
88 371 U.S. at 428-29. At issue in Button was the constitutionality of a Virginia statute
which provided that solicitation of legal services by attorneys constituted attorney malprac-
tice. Id. at 423-26 & 423 n.7. The Court held the statute unconstitutional as applied to the
NAACP-a corporation whose major purpose is to eradicate all barriers to racial equality.
Id. at 419, 428-29. The Court stated that the NAACP's activities are protected "modes of
expression and association." Id. at 428. Subsequent decisions interpreting Button have es-
tablished the principle that "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." United
Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971); see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
376 n.32 (1977).
8 436 U.S. at 427. The Court stated: "[T]he ACLU . . . much like the NAACP . . .
'engage[s]' in extensive educational and lobbying activities and 'also [devotes] much of [its]
funds.. . to an extensive training program of litigation on behalf of [their] declared pur-
poses."' Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 419-20). Notably, the Primus Court
rejected the argument that, because the ACLU has a policy of requesting an award of coun-
sel fees, their activities did not fall under the protective umbrella of Button. 436 U.S. at 429.
The Court concluded that the legal activities of the ACLU were "'a form of political expres-
sion' and 'political association,'" id. at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429,
431), and therefore, the attorney's letter to the victim clearly was protected by the first
amendment freedom of expression, 436 U.S. at 431. Furthermore, the Court observed that
the ACLU's litigation was not only a form of political activity, but was also a method of
conveying important information to the public-a form of commercial speech. See id. at
431. Thus, the Court reasoned, the ACLU's activity was protected by traditional first
amendment considerations as well as the commercial-speech doctrine. -See id.
88 436 U.S. 447 (1978); see infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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the companion case to Primus." The distinguishing factor, ob-
served the Court, was that the speech in Primus was a form of
associational expression intended to advance "beliefs and ideas."90
Therefore, Primus can be understood independently of the com-
mercial speech doctrine, in that Primus' political activity was sub-
ject to absolute first amendment protection.
In Ohralik, an experienced attorney who personally solicited
the business of two young auto accident victims"' was found guilty
of in-person solicitation.2 Suspending the attorney indefinitely for
his conduct, the Ohralik Court initially noted that the Bates deci-
sion was not dispositive, since in-person solicitation vastly differs
from the type of advertising sanctioned in Bates.9 3 In so distin-
guishing Bates, the Court focused upon the direct pressure and
one-sidedness endemic to in-person solicitation and its attendant
encouragement of hasty, uninformed decisionmaking.94 After rec-
ognizing that the states have the primary responsibility for main-
taining professional standards for lawyers, 5 the Court observed
that the advertising in Bates did not erode this state interest,
whereas the type of blatant solicitation involved in Ohralik seri-
ously implicated the states' power to preserve professionalism
89 436 U.S. at 435-36, 438-39. The Court distinguished the solicitation by letter in
Primus from the in-person solicitation in Ohralik, noting that "written communication les-
sens substantially the difficulty of policing solicitation practices. . . ." Id. at 435-36.
90 See id. at 422. Noting that the attorney's offer of legal services was premised upon
civil liberty objectives, rather than on pecuniary gain motives, as was the case in Ohralik,
the Court determined that such business constitutes associational activity which had al-
ready been afforded full first amendment protection. Id.; see Button, 371 U.S. at 430. See
generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 6-
15 (1964).
91 436 U.S. at 449-50. Ohralik visited the victim of an automobile accident in the hospi-
tal, offering to represent her in any ensuing litigation. The victim initially declined the offer,
but 2 days later she signed a contingency fee agreement with the attorney. Id. Additionally,
Ohralik secured an oral agreement to represent another party who was injured in the acci-
dent. Id. at 450-52.
912 Id. at 453. The attorney's conduct was determined to be violative of Ohio's Code of
Professional Responsibility. See id.; OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILTY DR 2-
103(A), DR 2-104(A) (1970). Despite a recommendation from the grievance committee that
the attorney be publicly reprimanded, the Ohio Supreme Court suspended the attorney in-
definitely. 436 U.S. at 453-54.
91 436 U.S. at 455, 458; see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
94 436 U.S. at 457. The Court stated that in-person solicitation actually may "disserve
the individual and societal interest . . . in facilitating 'informed and reliable decisionmak-
ing.'" Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 364).
91 Id. at 464; cf. 37 Fed. Reg. 22,934, 22,937 (1972) (Federal Trade Commission report
seeking to regulate harmful aspects of direct-selling industry).
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among lawyers. 6
It can be seen that even after Primus and Ohralik, a clear
standard for lawyer advertising, or for commercial speech gener-
ally, had not been articulated. Rather, Primus' political overtones
removed the case from the confines of pure commercial speech,
and the defendant's outrageous conduct in Ohralik gave rise to so
compelling a state interest that the establishment of a standard for
less offensive lawyer conduct would have been misplaced.9 7 It was
not until Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission"' that the Court enunciated a test for evaluating com-
mercial speech proscriptions and, as will be seen, this standard has
gravely impacted upon the law of attorney advertising.
The Central Hudson inquiry, applicable to commercial speech
cases generally, required judicial consideration of: (1) whether the
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, (2) whether
the state has advanced a substantial interest in the regulation, (3)
whether the regulation directly promotes that interest, and (4)
whether the regulation exceeds the bounds of necessity to serve
91 436 U.S. at 466. The majority believed that the Ohralik facts vividly illustrated the
harm inherent in in-person solicitation by attorneys. Id. at 468. An examination of the
Court's description of the facts makes this apparent:
[The attorney] approached two young accident victims at a time when they were
especially incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting
their own interests. He solicited Carol McClintock in a hospital room where she
lay in traction and sought out Wanda Lou Holbert on the day she came home
from the hospital, knowing from his prior inquiries that she had just been re-
leased. . . . He employed a concealed tape recorder .... He emphasized that his
fee would come out of the recovery, thereby tempting the young women with what
sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer. He refused to withdraw
Id. at 467.
17 See supra notes 90 & 96 and accompanying text.
98 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the New York Public Service Commission
ordered the cessation of all promotional advertising by electric utilities regarding the use of
electricity. Id. at 558. The only advertising that did not fall within the ambit of the order
was advertising deemed "informational" in nature-designed to lower consumption during
high demand periods. Id. at 560. Reversing the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court invalidated the regulation. Id. at 571. Although the commercial regulation was deter-
mined to be violative of the first amendment, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, recog-
nized a crucial distinction between commercial speech "and other varieties of speech,"
thereby necessitating different levels of protection. Id. at 562-63. Whereas noncommercial
speech is accorded full protection absent clear and present danger, Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), "[t]he protection available for particular commercial expres-
sion turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by
its regulation," 447 U.S. at 563. Thus, the Court reasoned that inaccurate or deceptive com-
mercial speech is always subject to state regulation. 447 U.S. at 563.
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such interest.99 Although in devising the test the Court culled the
rationales of earlier commercial speech decisions, 100 the Central
Hudson holding was not of the limited, ad hoc variety.10 Rather,
in requiring a state to show that a regulation is "no more extensive
than is necessary to serve the [substantial] state interest" at
stake,10 2 the Central Hudson standard appears to provide the long-
awaited beacon by which the constitutionality of proscriptions on
commercial speech clearly can be ascertained. 0 3
IV. In re R.M.J.-A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
After the Bates decision, a number of states amended their
rules concerning lawyer advertising. The Missouri Supreme Court,
for example, promulgated a revised disciplinary rule'0 4 whereby at-
torneys were permitted to publish ten categories of information in
newspapers, periodicals, and the telephone yellow pages. 05 An ad-
dendum to the amended rule required any lawyer who mentioned
areas of practice, to do so by either listing one of three descriptive
terms-General Civil Practice, General Criminal Practice, or Gen-
eral Civil and Criminal Practice, or by indicating one of twenty-
99 447 U.S. at 566. Applying the four-prong test, Justice Powell noted that the advertis-
ing of information regarding services by public utilities was clearly a lawful activity, id. at
566-68; that the state had a legitimate interest in energy conservation and ensuring a "fair
and efficient" rate structure, id. at 568-69; and that the state's interests were directly ad-
vanced by the regulation, id. at 569. With respect to the fourth inquiry, the extensiveness of
the regulation, however, the Court concluded that the state's interest in energy conservation'
did not justify suppressing "all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact of the
touted service on overall energy use." Id. at 570. It is suggested that the import of Central
Hudson is not the protection afforded public utilities but its enunciation of a clearly de-
fined, yet flexible standard by which to evaluate commercial advertising. The flexibility of
the Central Hudson test lay in the relative weight to be accorded any one part of the test.
Justice Powell indicated that the crucial inquiry in Central Hudson was the extensiveness of
the state regulation, id. at 569-70, implying that more weight may be attributed another
part of the test in a different factual situation.
110 See id. at 561-66.
101 In delineating the specific elements of the four-part inquiry, the Court did not con-
fine the applicability of the test to advertisements by commercial utilities. See id. at 566.
102 Id. at 564. Clearly, in the absence of a showing that the state has a substantial
interest in the regulation at issue, the remaining tiers of analysis will be rendered unneces-
sary. See id. at 566.
103 Compare Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25 and Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826
with Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
104 Mo. CODE: OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1983).
105 Id. DR 2-101(B)(1)-(10). Permissible categories of information in an advertisement
included, inter alia, firm name, the names of professional associates, particular areas or
fields of law, and the fees for initial consultations and certain routine services. Id. DR 2-
101(B)(1), (2), (7), (10).
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three specific areas of practice." 6 With respect to the inclusion of
specific fields of practice in the advertisement, attorneys were pre-
cluded from stating that their practice was limited to the desig-
nated areas and were required to disclaim certification of exper-
tise.10 7 Additionally, the Missouri rule permitted lawyers to send
announcement cards to indicate changes in associates, firm name
or related matters.108 The persons to whom such announcements
could be delivered, however, were restricted to other attorneys,
present and former clients, relatives and personal friends. 109
Subsequent to the rule revision, R.M.J., a Missouri attorney,
was charged with violating the regulations by placing an advertise-
ment in two telephone directories and a neighborhood newspaper.
Specifically, R.M.J. listed the courts to which he was admitted to
practice, indicated areas of the law which were not approved by
the disciplinary rule, and failed to disclaim certification of exper-
tise in the areas of practice listed."0 In addition, announcement
cards were sent to persons other than those specifically permitted
under the rule."'
Arguing that the advertising restrictions contravened the first
amendment, R.M.J. urged the Missouri Supreme Court to modify
its standards in accordance with the four-part test enunciated in
Central Hudson.12 Despite the apparent applicability of Central
Hudson, the Missouri court refused to apply that case's four-part
test, stating that it "respectfully decline[d] to enter the thicket of
attempting to anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hoc judg-
ments of a majority of the justices of the United States Supreme
Court.1 " 3 Indeed, although acknowledging that it was presented
with a "test" case, the Missouri court held that the revised rules
were the exclusive permissible criteria for lawyer advertising and
10 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1982). The addendum to DR 2-101 prohibited
any deviation from the particular phraseology set forth in the regulation. See id. at 196 n.6.
107 MO. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(A)(2) (1983).
10 Id.
109 Id. The disciplinary rule did not permit a description of the nature of the attorney's
practice, except in certain limited circumstances permitted under DR 2-105. Id.
110 455 U.S. at 197-98. R.M.J. listed the terms "personal injury" and "workmen's com-
pensation" rather than the prescribed "tort law" and "workers compensation law." Id. at
197 n.8. In addition, the advertisement included the term "contracts," which had no coun-
terpart in the addendum. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
11 455 U.S. at 198.
112 In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d at 412.
I's Id. (emphasis in original).
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therefore privately reprimanded R.M.J. 114
On appeal, the Supreme Court initially noted that under
Bates, lawyers could advertise prices for routine legal services and
that such advertising was not inherently misleading. 115 Reviewing
commercial speech precedent, a unanimous Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Powell, then emphasized that it is entirely
proper for states to regulate commercial speech if the purpose is to
curb false, deceptive or misleading advertising."" Thereafter, Jus-
tice Powell summarized the present status of the commercial
speech doctrine as applied to advertising by professionals:
'1 Id. The Missouri court recognized R.M.J.'s right to appeal, stating that it would
reserve judgment on the validity of the disciplinary rule, pending a decision by the Supreme
Court. Id. Dissenting, Chief Justice Bardgett objected to the requirement in the Advisory
Committee's addendum that only certain boilerplate language be used to describe the attor-
ney's field of practice. Id. at 414 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice asserted that
"[tihe addendum [should] be considered as a guide and that no unethical conduct is com-
mitted if the terminology used to describe a field of practice is reasonable and fairly de-
scribes to a nonlawyer the field of law" indicated in the advertisement. Id. (Bardgett, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Chief Justice Bardgett contended that R.M.J.
did not engage in unethical conduct by stating that he was admitted to practice in Missouri,
Illinois and the United States Supreme Court. Id. (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting).
Judge Seiler, filing a separate dissenting opinion, contended that the charge regarding
the disclaimer should have been dismissed, since R.M.J., upon being notified of the rule,
immediately attempted to modify the advertisement. Id. at 415-16 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
Unlike Chief Justice Bardgett, who condoned a listing indicating practice before the Su-
preme Court, id. at 414 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting), Judge Seiler doubted that the
"[i]nformational value gained by the consumer by advertising [this] isolated fact. . . jus-
tifie[d] the risk of the false impression that such advertising may convey," id. at 416 (Seiler,
J., dissenting). Although questioning the propriety of a listing, Judge Seiler nevertheless
asserted that R.M.J.'s advertisement did not warrant discipline. Id. (Seiler, J., dissenting).
Judge Seiler found particularly disturbing the limited variety of phrases offered in the ad-
dendum to describe areas of legal practice. Id. (Seiler, J., dissenting). Indeed, Judge Seiler
contended that many of the phrases used by R.M.J. in his advertisement actually might
have been more helpful to consumers than the limited terms provided in the addendum. Id.
(Seiler, J., dissenting).
"1' 455 U.S. at 199.
116 Id. at 200. Justice Powell elaborated on the limits of the Bates holding:
[T]he decision in Bates. . . was a narrow one. The [Bates] Court emphasized that
advertising by lawyers still could be regulated. False, deceptive, or misleading ad-
vertising remains subject to restraint, and the Court recognized that advertising
by the professions poses special risks of deception . . . . [C]laims as to quality or
in-person solicitation might be so likely to mislead as to warrant restriction. . ..
[and] a warning or disclaimer might be appropriately required.
Thus, the Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent cases that regula-
tion-and imposition of discipline-are permissible where the particular advertis-
ing is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular
form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.
Id. at 200-02 (footnotes and citations omitted).
LAWYER ADVERTISING
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular
content or method of advertising suggests that it is inherently
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such ad-
vertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate
restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.
But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information .... [R]estrictions
upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably neces-
sary to prevent the deception.
Even when a communication is not misleading, the State re-
tains some authority to regulate. But the State must assert a sub-
stantial interest and the interference with speech must be in pro-
portion to the interest served. Restrictions must be narrowly
drawn, and the State lawfully may regulate only to the extent
regulation furthers the State's substantial interest.117
Applying the above language, which is essentially that of Central
Hudson,"1 8 Justice Powell declined to sanction the restrictions
placed upon lawyer advertising since the state was unable to
demonstrate that the attorney's statements were misleading or
that a substantial state interest was fostered by the regulations.11 9
Although the Court deemed problematic the potentially misleading
nature of a listing which stated that an attorney is a member of
the bar of the Supreme Court, 20 it found no justification for a rule
prohibiting the publication of the jurisdictions in which a lawyer is
licensed to practice. Thus, Justice Powell determined that the pub-
lication of the information in R.M.J.'s advertisement was permissi-
ble in the absence of evidence that such material is misleading.1 21
' Id. at 203 (footnotes and citations omitted).
118 See id.; see supra note 99 and accompanying text. The Court conceded that the
Central Hudson guidelines failed to provide a comprehensive framework, but asserted that
more adequate guidelines would emerge as the case law developed. 455 U.S. at 204 n.16.
19 455 U.S. at 205-07. The Court noted that the particular listing in question was
neither misleading nor deceptive. Citing the lower court dissent, Justice Powell observed
that the listing may in fact be more informative than the material prescribed by the adden-
dum. Id. at 205. Justice Powell then indicated that the state could not assert a substantial
interest in prohibiting attorney's from listing the jurisdictions in which they are licensed to
practice. The Justice considered this information "factual and highly relevant." Id.
120 Id. Justice Powell considered R.M.J.'s listing of admission to practice before the
Supreme Court to be in "bad taste" and potentially misleading, particularly when the public
is "unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of [the Supreme Court]." Id.
Nevertheless, the Justice stated that no showing had been made of the listing's misleading
nature. Id. at 205-06.
121 Id. at 206-07.
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Furthermore, the Court rejected the mailing of the announcements
as a basis for disciplinary action, noting that a means of supervis-
ing mailings and handbill distribution less restrictive than an abso-
lute prohibition was possible.122 Justice Powell concluded that
state regulation of commercial speech in general, and lawyer adver-
tising in particular, must be accomplished in a limited and reason-
able manner.123 It is axiomatic that an absolute prohibition does
not meet this requirement.124
A. R.M.J. as a Predictable Culmination
It is suggested that R.M.J. is a logical outgrowth of the Su-
preme Court's previous treatment of commercial speech cases. Tra-
ditionally, the Court has construed commercial speech quite nar-
rowly.125 Similarly, the decisions rendered in the aftermath of
Bates failed to expatiate lawyer advertising beyond the prohibition
of an absolute proscription.1 26 It was not until Central Hudson
that the Court extended first amendment protection to all purely
commercial speech that is neither deceptive nor misleading. 2 ' No-
tably, that decision did not specifically address the issue of lawyer
advertising. As a result, significant restrictions remained upon that
form of speech, as the states attempted "to construe [Bates] nar-
rowly. . . and rewrite the rules preserving as much of the old tra-
dition as could be rationalized constitutionally. ' 128 Faced with the
natural progression from Virginia Pharmacy to Central Hudson,
the R.M.J. Court was presented with an opportunity to continue
this judicial expansionism, and extricate lawyer advertising from
the confines of Bates. Thus, R.M.J., in extending Central Hudson
to lawyer advertising specifically, appears to be a predictable cul-
mination of the commercial speech cases. Indeed, it safely can be
122 Id. at 206; see infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
123 455 U.S. at 207. The regulation of advertising that is inherently misleading or shown
to be misleading would continue to be within the domain of state authority. Id.
124 Id.
125 See supra notes 16-54 and accompanying text.
16 See supra notes 55-97 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
128 Boden, supra note 3, at 555. Despite the Bates mandate that lawyer advertising was
within the ambit of first amendment protection, "most state disciplinary authorities did
indeed try to salvage as much of the pre-Bates regulatory scheme as could be accomplished,
while giving lip service to the constitutional right identified in Bates." Id. Such state reac-
tions may be understandable in light of Bates' failure to articulate clearly a standard by
which the states were to abide. Id; see supra note 3.
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stated that R.M.J. is to Bates in the context of lawyer advertising
what Central Hudson was to Virginia Pharmacy in the area of
commercial speech generally-an enunciation of a workable stan-
dard and an expansion of first amendment protection.
B. The Substantial State Interest Standard
The commercial speech doctrine, premised in large part upon
the public's right of access to a free flow of information,129 requires
a state to demonstrate a substantial interest to support any pro-
scription on commercial speech. 30 As implemented, the quantifica-
tion of substantiality has been achieved through a balancing of va-
rious factors, 131 with the Court evincing a proclivity toward the
interests of the public. Significantly, the identical test has been ap-
plied to all forms of commercial speech.132 The Court has indi-
cated, however, that the advertisement of professional services is
inherently dissimilar to other commercial speech forms.133 Thus,
the question arises whether lawyer advertising commands a differ-
ent level of judicial scrutiny.
The commercial speech doctrine presupposes that the public
has a right to know-a right to be exposed to a free flow of infor-
mation.13 4 In Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court, observed that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is
129 See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
130 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
It is the substantial interest test component of the Central Hudson inquiry which repre-
sents the crucial distinction between the protection afforded commercial speech and that
afforded traditionally protected free speech. Whereas a state must demonstrate a substan-
tial interest in commercial-speech cases, id. at 564, it must establish the presence of a clear
and present danger in pure-speech cases, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
1M1 The line of cases from Virginia Pharmacy to R.M.J. balanced the interests of the
state or locality against those of the speaker and the public. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 761-70. In devising its four-part inquiry, the Central Hudson Court drew from
these cases and established what is essentially a four-tiered balancing test. See Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-71.
132 The Central Hudson Court enunciated its test for general application to commercial
speech. See 447 U.S. at 566. Until R.M.J., however, it was unclear whether that test would
apply to lawyer advertising. By adopting the Central Hudson inquiry, the R.M.J. Court
indicated that all commercial-speech cases will be governed by the same standard. See In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203-04.
11' See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. The R.M.J. Court observed that "the
Central Hudson formulation must be applied to advertising for professional services with
the understanding that the special characteristics of such services afford opportunities to
mislead and confuse that are not present when standardized products or services are offered
to the public." 455 U.S. at 204 n.15 (emphasis supplied).
11 See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
a reciprocal right to receive the advertising . . . . 135 Whereas the
interests of the speaker are merely economic,13 1 "the particular
consumer's interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate."'"" The Bates
Court recognized that a potential client has an interest in lawyer
advertising similar to that of the consumer,13s and the lawyer, as
speaker, has interests similar to those of other commercial adver-
tisers. 1 Certainly, those who most need access to legal informa-
tion, the middle seventy percent of the population, are the persons
least able to bear the consequences of limitations on their access to
such data.140 Therefore, just as consumer access to commercial in-
formation in general is essential to the free enterprise system, in-
formation concerning lawyers specifically is a necessary ingredient
for private economic decisionmaking. Additionally, lawyer adver-
tising is "helpful, perhaps indispensable, to the formation of an in-
telligent opinion by the public on how well the legal system is
working and whether it should be regulated or even altered.' 4'
The foregoing analysis indicates that the policy considerations
implicit in the Supreme Court's evaluation of traditional commer-
cial speech are equally applicable to lawyer advertising.'42 In exam-
ining the public's interests with respect to purely economic com-
mercial speech, the Court appropriately determined that a
"' 425 U.S. at 757. The right to receive advertising is not a transient right that disap-
pears when such information is otherwise available. Justice Blackmun stated that there is
"no general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners
could come by his message by some other means .... " Id. at 757 n.15.
131 Id. at 762. The fact that the commercial speaker's interests are purely economic is
not dispositive on the issue of the degree of protection afforded that speech. Indeed, Justice
Blackmun indicated in Virginia Pharmacy that the interests of labor disputants are "prima-
rily economic" but nevertheless protected by the first amendment when transposed into
expression. Id. at 762-63.
" Id. at 763.
138 See 433 U.S. at 364-65. The Bates Court noted that its decision to hold Arizona's
disciplinary rule unconstitutional flowed a fortiori from the Virginia Pharmacy analysis of
consumer interest in advertising. Id. at 365.
See id. at 368-69 & 368 n.19.
,4 Id. at 376-77. Justice Blackmun observed that a number of studies have revealed a
hesitation to seek the services of an attorney because of the paucity of available information
regarding those services. Id. at 370-71. The average citizen is uninformed with respect to the
fees for specific services, id. at 370 & n.22, and as to which lawyers are competent to handle
certain problems, id. at 371 n.23.
I" Id. at 358 (quoting In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 402, 555 P.2d 640, 648 (1976)
(Holohan, J., dissenting)).
"I' See supra notes 38-54, 98-103 and accompanying text.
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substantial interest inquiry was the proper standard of review.143
The myriad of issues surfacing in lawyer advertising cases parallel
those presented in the general commercial speech cases. 14 4 It thus
would appear that the R.M.J. Court correctly applied the substan-
tial interest test to the commercialization of legal services.
C. The Direct Mailing Controversy
Another important aspect of R.M.J. concerns state prohibi-
tions on the solicitation of clients by direct mailing. 145 Prior to
R.M.J., state courts employed two diametrically opposed ap-
proaches to resolve this problem.146 The first approach upheld
prohibitions on direct mailing and relied primarily on Ohralik.47
These courts reasoned that since direct mailing was solicitation for
pecuniary gain, 48 it was subject to inherent abuses similar to those
M' Since Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding commercial speech
wholly without the ambit of first amendment protection), the Court has incrementally rec-
ognized the value of commercial speech. The Virginia Pharmacy Court emphasized: "[E]ven
if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public
decisionmaking in a democracy, [it could not be said] that the free flow of [commercial]
information does not serve that goal." Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (1976). Through
an evolutionary progression, the Court has afforded protection to a vital form of speech
which is potentially of greater value than political speech. Id. at 763. To be sure, the Su-
preme Court has recognized certain peculiarities inherent in commercial speech lending
credence to the sanction of such speech's limited state regulation.
Despite the important role commercial speech plays in society, the state clearly retains
a legitimate interest in protecting the citizen as consumer. Certain doctrines of the law of
contracts-unconscionability, duress, overreaching, and misrepresentation-are distinctively
related to the state's regulatory powers so that the state "can legitimately claim an interest
quite distinct from the suppression of free expression." Farber, Commercial Speech and
First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372, 408 (1979). It is suggested that the sub-
stantial interest test-not an absolute bar to state regulation because of the legitimacy of
the state's role in protecting the consumer, yet a demanding standard necessitated by the
import of the information at hand-is a uniquely capable standard by which both the state's
and the public's interests will be adequately protected.
14 See supra notes 38-54, 98-103 and accompanying text.
146 455 U.S. at 206.
146 Compare Florida Bar Ass'n v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595, 600 (Fla. 1981) (direct mail
solicitation may be prohibited) and Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496
(La. 1978) (ban on mail solicitation upheld) with Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140,
151, 412 N.E.2d 927, 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 878-79 (1980) (ban on mail advertising may not
constitutionally be upheld), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981) and Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978) (mail advertising may not be prohibited).
147 See, e.g., Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 428, 393
A.2d 1175, 1181 (1978); see also supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
"4s See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595, 599 (Fla. 1981) (harm was "the
blinding of an attorney's legal judgment by pecuniary light").
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of in-person solicitation, 149 and therefore, could be prohibited by
state regulation. In contrast, the second approach invalidated pro-
scriptions on direct mailing, concluding that mailings are akin to
the type of advertising sanctioned in Bates,150 and, accordingly, are
constitutionally protected under the commercial speech doc-
trine. 151
The R.M.J. Court, in a cursory discussion, apparently adopted
the second approach, 152 holding that the direct mailing in issue
could not be constitutionally prohibited.'53 The Court, however,
4' See, e.g., id. at 599-600; Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496
(La. 1978); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text. Conceding that the potential
dangers associated with direct mailings are not as grave as those present in in-person solici-
tations, e.g., Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d at 496, courts have expressed
three major concerns with solicitation by mail. First, it has been maintained that the ability
of direct mailings to reach a specifically targeted audience enhances the possibility that at-
torneys may exert undue influence over a vulnerable populace. See Florida Bar v. Schreiber,
407 So. 2d 595, 599 (Fla. 1981). Direct-mailing lists provide perhaps the greatest potential
for overreaching. For instance, it is not difficult to imagine a probate attorney seeking to
obtain lists from funeral homes of the next-of-kin of recently deceased persons, or a per-
sonal-injury lawyer attempting to secure from hospitals the names and addresses of recently
admitted accident victims. Such solicitation is clearly no more desirable than the "ambu-
lance chasing" involved in Ohralik. Second, courts indicate'that mail solicitation may invade
the privacy of the recipient and force the information contained therein upon a "captive
audience." See id. at 598. It has been suggested that a person would feel compelled to open
a letter from an attorney, see id., and would not be inclined to discard it without reading it
carefully, as he might if it were sent by a traditional commercial establishment, see Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980). Finally, courts have
voiced a concern with the ability of the states to regulate direct mailing since mailings,
unlike newspaper advertising, are not in the "public domain." See Allison v. Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d at 496.
150 See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978); Koffier v. Joint
Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 146-47, 412 N.E.2d 927, 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875-76 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981); see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. It
should be noted that "direct mail is considered by marketing experts to be an advertising
medium." Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 AM. BAR FouND.
RESFARCH J. 967, 1018 [hereinafter cited as Lawyer Advertising].
"' See Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
Ass'n, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Koffier v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140,
147-50, 412 N.E.2d 927, 932-34, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 876-78 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026
(1981). The New York Court of Appeals applied the four-prong Central Hudson test to
direct mailings, concluding that the State interests were capable of protection by less re-
strictive regulation. See Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d at 147-50, 412 N.E.2d at 932-34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at
876-78; accord Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
M See 455 U.S. at 206-07.
"I5 Id. at 206. The Court observed that the State had neither articulated a substantial
interest nor illustrated that it had attempted to protect such an interest by using less re-
strictive regulations. See id. Moreover, the Court held that all of the restrictions imposed
upon R.M.J. were subject to the commercial-speech doctrine. See id. at 206-07. Thus, while
the Court did not expressly apply the Central Hudson test to direct mailings, its inquiry
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declined to address whether states have a more exigent interest in
direct mailings, thereby justifying more stringent regulation than
that imposed upon traditional advertising.1 " It is suggested that
the state's interest in direct mailings is indeed more compelling
than general commercial advertising because of the greater poten-
tial for overreaching and invasion of privacy. 155 Moreover, the
greater difficulties in supervising mail solicitation lend credence to
more intrusive state regulation.1 56
In light of the foregoing it is submitted that states should pro-
mulgate comprehensive regulations that protect the public from
the potential abuse of direct mail advertising by attorneys. As an
aid to the state legislatures, the following regulation is proposed:
A lawyer or law firm may use direct mail advertising pro-
vided it does not violate any statute or court rule, and is in accor-
dance with other disciplinary rules. For the purposes of this sec-
tion direct mailings shall consist of all material intended as an
advertisement, delivered to a person or persons in whatever form,
into possible government interests, and its employment of a less restrictive means analysis
indicates that the Central Hudson test was indeed applied. See id. at 206; supra notes 98-
103 and accompanying text. Clearly, an absolute prohibition on direct mailings could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Central Hudson test, since any significant state
interest may be protected, pursuant to the less restrictive means analysis, by carefully ar-
ticulated regulations. See Howard, Going About Suppressing Speech: A Comment on In the
Matter of R.M.J., 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 361, 362 (1982).
I" See 455 U.S. at 206. Though the Court indicated that the record was silent regard-
ing the ability of the states to supervise direct mailings, it stated that "[m]ailings and hand-
bills may be more difficult to supervise than newspapers." Id. In fact, the Court suggested
two regulations to curb direct-mailing abuses. See id. at 206 & n.20; infra notes 158-59 and
accompanying text.
15 See supra note 149. Even those courts which have invalidated direct-mailing pro-
hibitions have suggested that some regulation may be necessary to protect the public from
potential invasion of privacy. See 455 U.S. at 206 n.20; Bishop v. Commission on Profes-
sional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1231-32 (S.D. Iowa
1981). These courts have indicated that the public possibly could be frightened by receiving
a letter from an attorney's office. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206 n.20; Bishop, 521 F.
Supp. at 1231. Moreover, one post-R.M.J court, addressing the overreaching issue, held that
mail advertising directed toward a vulnerable segment of the population could be regulated
by the states. State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 246, 642 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1982).
2 See supra note 149. Pre-R.M.J. courts that invalidated prohibitions on direct mail-
ings conceded that mailings were more difficult to supervise than newspaper advertising,
and consequently, require additional regulation. See Bishop v. Commission on Professional
Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (S.D. Iowa 1981);
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978); Koffier v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51
N.Y.2d 140, 149-50, 412 N.E.2d 927, 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 878 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1026 (1981).
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including but not limited to, letters and announcement cards.157
1. All direct mailing conspicuously shall bear the
words "Advertising Content," "This is an Advertise-
ment," or other words of similar meaning, in the same
area as the return address. 58
2. A copy of any direct mailing and a list of the in-
tended recipients shall be mailed to the local bar associa-
tion advisory committee simultaneously with the delivery
of any direct mailing. 159
3. No direct mailing shall be sent to any person or
persons whom the lawyer knows or should know to be in a
physical or mental condition which would make it un-
likely that he or she could exercise reasonable, considered
judgment as to the selection of a lawyer.160
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF R.M.J. FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH
BY ATTORNEYS
Like the Bates decision, R.M.J. apparently will provide the
foundation for increased advertising on the part of attorneys.61 In-
deed, it is probable that R.M.J. will lead to increased lawyer adver-
tising for at least two reasons. First, the Supreme Court's rejection
'6' The word "delivered" includes any material delivered to the public by the United
States Postal Service, as well as any other method used to deliver material to the public.
I" See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206 n.20 (proposing "'This is an Advertisement' ");
Bishop v. Commission on Professional Ethics'& Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 521 F.
Supp.. 1219, 1231-32 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (suggesting "'Advertising Content' "). The require-
ment that the direct mailing be marked as an advertisement is designed to safeguard the
public's right to privacy. See Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1231-32. By stamping such a dis-
claimer on the mailing, the recipient is immediately advised that the material is commercial,
and may feel free to discard it. See id. at 1231.
159 Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.135; see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206. A filing requirement will
facilitate supervision of direct-mail advertising. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206. One com-
mentator suggests a requirement for "pre-clearance" of direct mailings by the state bar as-
sociation. See Comment, The First Amendment, In Re R.M.J., and State Regulation of
Direct Mail Lawyer Advertising, 34 BAYLOR L. Rav. 411, 429 (1982). Such a proposal has
been rejected by the ABA because of its dubious constitutionality. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPONSimmrrY DR 7.2(b) comment (1982). A simultaneous filing requirement for
direct mail, however, does not conflict with the constitutional doctrine of prior restraint, see
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931), yet adequately provides for supervision.
160 Cf. D.C. DR 2-103(a)(3) (1982) (referring to in-person solicitation). Minors, the men-
tally impaired, and other vulnerable segments of the population would be protected from
possible overreaching by a regulation prohibiting attorneys from knowingly issuing direct
mailings to persons incapable of exercising the judgment necessary to select an attorney.
Clearly, an attorney who knowingly dispatches direct mailings to such impaired persons
should receive more severe disciplinary sanctions than those who do so unwittingly.
161 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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of the advertising limitations devised by the Missouri Supreme
Court should induce other states that regulate the content or form
of such speech to amend their unduly restrictive attorney advertis-
ing rules.162 More importantly, by applying the Central Hudson
criteria to this field, the R.M.J. Court has provided the states with
clearer guidelines for formulating advertising regulations.6 3 This,
in turn, should encourage the states to eliminate ambiguities-a
major deterrent to the use of advertising by lawyers-that pervade
currently existing regulations, such as the difference, if any, be-
tween advertising and solicitation. 6 4
Despite the beneficial impact on lawyer advertising that is
likely to result from R.M.J., a caveat must be sounded. Studies
have shown that the majority of lawyers are reluctant to adver-
tise. 6 5 This reluctance stems, in part, from the negative perception
162 After the Bates decision, 49 jurisdictions revised their lawyer-advertising regula-
tions. L. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 43. Such changes in state law, however, have been met
with reluctance. See Andrews, The Selling of a Precedent, STUDENT LAW., (Mar. 1982), at
12, 14 [hereinafter cited as Andrews, The Selling]; Comment, supra note 159, at 412-13;
supra note 3.
163 See Comment, supra note 159, at 435-36. Some commentators contend that the
Central Hudson criteria impose too great a restriction upon state regulation of commercial
speech. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 6, at 26-27. Cox argues that the Central Hudson test
increases not only "the weight of the burden put upon the state," but also "the degree to
which judicial opinion is substituted for the state regulatory authority." Id. at 35. Such close
scrutiny, according to Cox, deprives a state of the opportunity to experiment with various
solutions to serious social problems. Id.
'" See Comment, supra note 159, at 435-36. But cf. Andrews, The Selling, supra note
162, at 14 (states have altered their regulations in ways intended to inhibit lawyer advertis-
ing since the Bates decision). The most recent controversy regarding attorney advertising
has focused upon the distinction between advertising and solicitation. See Comment, Solici-
tation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
R.v. 77, 78 (1973). The terms themselves are relatively simple to define: "Advertising in-
forms or calls attention to the lawyer and his willingness to provide legal services. Solicita-
tion is a more intense form of advertisement and is a pleading, an earnest request, and a
more personal petition than advertising." Comment, supra note 159, at 411. In addition, the
Court apparently has taken the position that advertising merits first amendment protection
while solicitation does not. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 199, 202. A problem arises, how-
ever, in determining what forms of lawyers' commercial speech constitute advertising and
what forms are actually solicitation. Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 47; see Bros-
nahan & Andrews, Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: In the Public Interest?, 46 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 423, 430 (1980).
I'l See, e.g., Hudec & Trebilcock, Lawyer Advertising and the Supply of Information
in the Market for Legal Services, 20 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 53, 68-69 (1982); Advertising At-
tracting Neither Participants Nor Supporters, 67 A.B.A. J., 1618, 1618 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Advertising]. A nationwide survey conducted in 1981 for the American Bar Associa-
tion Journal revealed that 67% of the lawyers polled indicated that they intended to refrain
from advertising, while 23% were "unlikely" to advertise or unsure if they would do so.
Advertising, supra, at 1618. A mere 10% of those polled stated that they had advertised in
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that lawyers have regarding the impact of advertising on the pro-
fession."' 6 Many believe, for example, that advertising of legal ser-
vices is inherently misleading. 6 7 It is also commonly believed that
only incompetent or unscrupulous attorneys need to advertise.'
Opinions such as these, as well as arguments with a firmer founda-
tion, will most likely preclude R.M.J. from resulting in a dramatic
increase in attorney advertising. 69 These disadvantages, however,
are more apparent than actual, as a brief examination df them will
demonstrate.
The most commonly exploited argument against lawyer adver-
tising is that it creates innumerable opportunities to mislead and
deceive the public. 70 Supposedly, the rationale underlying this
contention is that the uniqueness of legal services renders mislead-
ing any attempt to quote a standard fee.' 17  Assuming the truth of
this premise, an absolute ban on the information consumers need
to make intelligent decisions regarding legal action, nevertheless
the past. Id. at 1618.
I" See Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 48. The senior, established attorneys,
who control the promulgation of state advertising standards, tend to have a negative view of
lawyer advertising. Slavin, Lawyers and Madison Avenue, 6 BARIusTER 46, 48 (1979);
Braverman, A Perspective on Solicitation Emerging-Maybe!, 70 ILL. B.J. 310, 310 (1982).
17 See Advertising, supra note 165, at 1618. The American Bar Association's 1981 sur-
vey revealed that 51% of the attorneys polled believed that advertising by lawyers had
"misled" the public. Id.
168 Devine, Lawyer Advertising and the Kutak Commission: A Refreshing Return to
the Past, 18 WAKE FoREST L. Rav. 503, 510-11 (1982). Professor Devine contends that the
notion that attorneys "who advertise are per se bad" stems from the belief that there is a
longstanding tradition against lawyer advertising. Id. In actuality, there was no substantial
advertising regulation in the United States until 1888 and no outright prohibition until
1908. Note, Advertising, Solicitation, supra note 1, at 1182; infra notes 184-86 and accom-
panying text.
16' See Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 95; Note, Advertising, Solicitation,
supra note 1, at 1184-91.
170 See Note, Advertising, Solicitation, supra note 1, at 1182-84; Commentary, The So-
licitation Rule: Ethical Restrictions and Legal Fictions, 22 CATH. U.L. R-v. 218, 224-25
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Commentary, The Solicitation Rule].
17 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 372. In addition to the argument that the uniqueness of legal
services renders any attempt to set a standard fee misleading, the Bates Court cited two
other reasons why legal services advertising might be misleading: consumer ignorance as to
what services are needed, and the temptation for attorneys to emphasize factors irrelevant
to work quality. Id. at 372-75. A sizable number of lawyers apparently find these conten-
tions persuasive. The 1981 American Bar Association Journal survey found that 37% of the
members questioned believed that advertising gave the public false ideas concerning the
cost of routine legal services. Advertising, supra note 165, at 1619. The Court, however, was
unimpressed with these arguments, indicating that the nonfungibility of legal services does
not make a fixed fee quotation misleading if the required work is performed at the adver-
tised price. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-73.
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remains unjustified.172 Truthful, clearly presented information con-
cerning an attorney's educational background, areas of specializa-
tion, consultation fees, and prices for routine transactions, such as
uncontested divorces, presents minimal opportunity for decep-
tion.1 7 3 Furthermore, any presentation of information in a form
likely to deceive can be curtailed by state regulation, as the R.M.J.
Court emphasized. 17 4 Additionally, the intelligence of the consumer
of legal services should not be underestimated. 175 Though notably
ignorant of legal services, most consumers are reasonably exper-
ienced in detecting exaggerated advertising claims.M Thus, there
seems to be no justification for surmising that consumers would be
unable to assimilate advertising for legal services, particularly if
the use of jargon is avoided.'7
A closely related argument advanced for prohibiting lawyer
advertising is that such commercialization will impair the dignity
of the legal profession. 78 This postulate is based upon two false
premises: that only dishonest or inept lawyers will choose to adver-
tise, and that allowing lawyers to advertise violates an American
legal tradition. 79 Though there is a dearth of empirical data re-
garding the use of lawyer advertising, the available evidence indi-
172 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75; Devine, supra note 168, at 513.
173 See Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 71. It has been suggested that routine
services are likely to be the only legal services advertised, even under liberal advertising
rules, because of the inability of advertising media to portray complex information effec-
tively. Id. at 68. Assuming this to be true, the chance that deceptive advertisements will be
circulated is decreased, since it is the complexity of legal services that allegedly creates op-
portunities for deceit. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
17 See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207. The R.M.J. Court stated:
[W]e emphasize. . . that the States retain the authority to regulate advertising
that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice.
There may be other substantial state interests as well that will support carefully
drawn restrictions.
Id.
175 See Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 71.
178 Id.
177 Id.
17' See, e.g., Note, Advertising, Solicitation, supra note 1, at 1184; Commentary, The
Solicitation Rule, supra note 170, at 224-25.
178 Christensen, Advertising by Lawyers, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 619, 619-20; Devine, supra
note 168, at 509-11. Distaste for lawyer advertising is actually a British legal tradition. Com-
ment, Legal Ethics: The Solicitation Prohibition, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 383, 383 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Comment, Legal Ethics]. This sentiment flourished in England because the
practice of law was originally the prerogative of the well-to-do, who frowned on merchant-
like behavior among their own. Commentary, The Solicitation Rule, supra note 170, at 218-
19 & 218 n.1.
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cates that lack of clients, not lack of ethics, impels lawyers to ex-
periment with advertising. s0 Legal neophytes, or those seeking to
establish a practice in a locale where they are not well known, have
great difficulty acquiring clients under existing advertising rules.'8 '
This does not intimate, however, that these attorneys will resort to
garish commercialization of their services if advertising regulations
are liberalized. 8 2 Since clients prefer to consult with lawyers they
perceive as competent, honest, and responsible, a lawyer's advertis-
ing must reflect that image for it to be successful.18 3 Meretricious
advertising techniques would thus defeat the purpose of
advertising.
The argument that lawyer advertising violates an American
tradition similarly is misconceived. Prior to the early 1900's, there
was no traditional ban on lawyer advertising.18 4 The prohibition
180 E.g., Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 48-49; Slavin, supra note 166, at 46-
47. For accounts of recently admitted attorneys who sought to establish a practice by using
advertising, see Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 12-14, 47-48; Vilkin, Lawyer Uses
Direct Mail to Drum Up Rights Cases, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 11, col. 1.
181 See Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 12; Landon, Lawyers and Localities:
The Interaction of Community Context and Professionalism, 1982 Am. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 459, 462; Slavin, supra note 166, at 47; Whitman, supra note 37, at 40-41; Com-
ment, supra note 159, at 413. The present attitude of the American bar toward advertising
has the effect of dividing the profession into two classes: those who serve the rich, and those
who serve the poor. See Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 49; Comment, supra note
164, at 83. Attorneys for "rich men" supposedly advertise by "ethical" means, such as law-
yer referral networks, public relations campaigns, and law lists-lawyer directories of lim-
ited circulation. Commentary, The Solicitation Rule, supra note 170, at 219; Comment,
supra note 164, at 82-84. In the absence of media access, however, "poor men's" attorneys
have no effective means of advertising available to them. Commentary, The Solicitation
Rule, supra note 170, at 224; Comment, supra note 164, at 77.
182 See, e.g., Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 72; Note, Advertising, Solicitation,
supra note 1, at 1190; Commentary, The Solicitation Rule, supra note 170, at 224-25. At
least two different arguments have been advanced to support the proposition that lawyers
would not resort to undignified advertising if all advertising restrictions were removed.
First, other professionals who routinely advertise, such as engineers and bankers, have suf-
fered no loss of public esteem since they began doing so. L. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 20;
Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 72; Note, Advertising, Solicitation, supra note 1, at
1190. Additionally, several surveys have shown that the public is more interested in factors
such as a lawyer's professional competence than the price charged for his services. See
Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 72.
10S See Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 48; Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note
165, at 72.
104 See Devine, supra note 168, at 506-07. The first lawyer advertising regulations
adopted in the United States were adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1888,
and subsequently were adopted by other jurisdictions. Id. at 506; Note, Advertising, Solici-
tation, supra note 1, at 1182. It was not until 1908 that the American Bar Association
sought to persuade American attorneys not to advertise, stating that "[tihe most worthy and
effective advertisement possible . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
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evolved as a result of the attempt to prevent the growing class of
urban lawyers from adopting the tasteless forms of newspaper ad-
vertising prevalent at the time."s' In fact, it was not until the adop-
tion of the present Code of Professional Responsibility that the
ban on lawyer advertising uniformly was adopted by all jurisdic-
tions.""' Obviously, therefore, the American "tradition" of preclud-
ing attorney advertising is not historically rooted.
Another popular argument espoused for prohibiting advertis-
ing by attorneys is that commercialization of legal services will re-
sult in additional frivolous litigation.18 7 There is no decisive evi-
dence, however, indicating that lawyer solicitation encourages
laymen unjustifiably to resort to legal services."88 This contention,
moreover, assumes the dubious proposition that lawyers will agree
to render legal services where such services are unwarranted.
Other critics of lawyer advertising believe that commercializa-
tion would prove more harmful than beneficial to consumers of le-
gal services. These critics contend that the use of advertising by
lawyers either results in increasing the cost of legal services s or
reducing their quality.190 The increasing cost argument presumes
that advertising will decrease economic competition among provid-
professional capacity and fidelity to trust." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908);
see Devine, supra note 168, at 507. The ABA's recommended proscription, however, was not
absolute, since it permitted the publication of business cards as well as their private circula-
tion. See Devine, supra note 168, at 507.
185 Devine, supra note 168, at 507. The 1908 advertising ban, contained in Canon 27 of
the Code of Professional Ethics, was promulgated in order to bring both rural and urban
lawyers under the same advertising rule. Id. Urban lawyers were forbidden to advertise in
the sensationalist city press of the era, while rural practitioners were permitted to continue
placing the same type of dignified advertisements current in "Abraham Lincoln's day." Id.
at 506-07.
168 Christensen, supra note 179, at 621.
187 See Commentary, The Solicitation Rule, supra note 170, at 222; Comment, supra
note 164, at 90. One of the long-standing arguments against attorney advertising is that it
leads to abuses of the legal system. See Comment, Legal Ethics, supra note 179, at 383-84.
Three types of such abuse were common-law crimes: barratry, champerty, and maintenance.
Commentary, The Solicitation Rule, supra note 170, at 222. Barratry was "Et]he offense of
frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits ... ." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 137
(5th ed. 1979). Champerty, on the other hand, involved "a bargain by a stranger with a
party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation... in
consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds . . . ." Id. at 209. Finally,
maintenance involved "an officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one
.... " Id. at 860.
18" See Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 80-81.
180 See, e.g., id. at 54.
190 See, e.g., Devine, supra note 168, at 510-11; Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at
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ers of legal services and thus raise prices.191 Basic economic princi-
ples, however, refute this argument. Effective advertising generally
results in increased competition with decreased prices, and no
plausible reasons have been voiced indicating that the legal ser-
vices market will act contrary to this economic hypothesis."9 2 The
decreasing quality argument implies the opposite assump-
tion-that quality of services must diminish in order to defray ad-
vertising costs. 193 This argument, of course, overlooks the possibil-
ity that successful advertising, by increasing caseloads, would pay
for itself.'"
The last major argument advanced against lawyer advertising
is that its existence would require a regulatory scheme that would
be too complex and troublesome to enforce.9 5 To the extent that
lawyer advertising is beneficial to the public, however, this argu-
ment has little merit, for the mere difficulty of a task is not suffi-
cient justification to refuse to undertake it.""8 The benefits of law-
yer advertising thus merit brief examination.
First, lawyer advertising undoubtedly would help make mem-
bers of the public more aware of their legal needs. 97 Although ba-
'' See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 377. The argument that lawyer advertising decreases
competition rests on the belief that only large lucrative firms would be able to afford adver-
tising, and would use it to acquire monopoly power in the legal services market. Id. Ironi-
cally, these are the very firms that neither need nor desire conventional advertising tech-
niques. Commentary, The Solicitation Rule, supra note 170, at 219-20; supra note 181 and
accompanying text.
'192 See Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON.
337, 350-52 (1972); Nagle, Do Advertising-Profitability Studies Really Show That Advertis-
ing Creates a Barrier to Entry?, 24 J.L. & ECON. 333, 349 (1981); Schuck, Consumer Igno-
rance in the Area of Legal Services, 43 INS. COUNS. J. 568, 568 (1976); Whitman, supra note
37, at 42-45.
10 See Devine, supra note 168, at 511; McChesney & Muris, The Effect of Advertising
on the Quality of Legal Services, 65 A.B.A. J. 1503, 1504 (1979); Staton, Access to Legal
Services Through Advertising and Specialization, 53 IND. L.J. 247, 258 (1978). One study
indicated that the services of a legal clinic that advertised extensively were perceived by
consumers as being of higher quality than those of traditional firms, even though the cost of
services was less. McChesney & Muris, supra, at 1504.
194 See Devine, supra note 168, at 511; Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 75.
195 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 379; Comment, supra note 159, at 431-32.
Is See Bates, 433 U.S. at 379; L. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 5.
"I See Bates, 433 U.S. at 376-77; L. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 27; Hudec & Trebilcock,
supra note 165, at 61; Comment, supra note 159, at 430. Andrews cites a Nebraska State
Bar Association Study which illustrates that lawyers and nonlawyers have differing percep-
tions of legal needs. Members of both groups were asked how they would react if their lawn-
mower unexpectedly exploded. L. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 27. Over 75% of the lawyers
indicated they would consult an attorney promptly, as oppposed to less than 15% of the
nonlawyers. Id. at 27. It is arguable, of course, that it may be better for American society if
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sic knowledge is essential to making an informed choice concerning
legal action, few members of the public are adequately informed to
make such a decision.-1 8 Advertising also can aid people in identi-
fying the characteristics they desire in an attorney, thus enabling a
more educated choice of advocates.199 More importantly, without
sufficient information about the availability of legal services, mean-
ingful access to such services cannot exist.200 Such access is crucial,
not only because it constitutes a fundamental right, but because it
can function as an important tool of political and social change by
fostering group action.20 1 Until such access is achieved, Ethical
Consideration 1-1 remains little more than an empty promise.0 2
Advertising also may benefit the profession, not merely by in-
creasing clientele, but by working to equalize the status among the
various subgroups of the bar.203 According to a recent study, one of
people were not encouraged to take every minor grievance to court. But, as Justice Powell
observed in Bates, "[w]e cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action." Bates, 433 U.S. at 376 (footnote
omitted).
198 See Andrews, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 150, at 1009; Hudec & Trebilcock,
supra note 165, at 62; Schuck, supra note 192, at 568; Staton, supra note 193, at 255. Possi-
bly due to a dearth of available information regarding law and lawyers, most laymen rely on
recommendations from others in selecting attorneys. Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165,
at 63-64. Barbara Curran's in-depth study of the public's legal needs revealed that a major-
ity of those surveyed relied on someone's recommendation in choosing their first lawyer and
even a greater percentage did so in selecting lawyers for subsequent problems. B. CURRN,
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 201 (1977).
'" See, e.g., Smith & Meyer, Attorney Advertising: A Consumer Perspective, 44 J.
MARKETING 56, 62 (1980); Schuck, supra note 192, at 569-70.
200 See Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, 11 LAw
& Soc'y REv. 247, 253-54 (1976); Comment, supra note 164, at 78-80. The reason the lack of
information about legal services denies the uninformed access to counsel is not difficult to
ascertain: "[H]ow will the public know if the employment of a lawyer is advantageous if
they never discover that an attorney's services are available?" Comment, supra note 159, at
430.
201 See Nader, supra note 200, at 253-54. Nader's viewpoint on the legal access issue is
that of the consumer advocate. His suggested program of legal action is geared toward both
removing existing abuses of political and economic power and reshaping the framework of
governmental power so that the will of the people can be made known by more direct means
than the ballot box. See id. at 250-51.
202 See id. at 254; Shadur, supra note 4, at 325. Ethical Consideration 1-1 states, in
pertinent part: "A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every per-
son in our society should have ready access to the independent professional services of a
lawyer of integrity and competence." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrry EC 1-1
(1979). Ethical Consideration 2-1 expresses a similar concern. See id. EC 2-1 (1979).
203 It has been recognized that current advertising rules help perpetuate class distinc-
tions between wealthy lawyers and poorer ones. See Comment, supra note 164, at 83-84.
Advertising has enabled some of the "poorer" attorneys to acquire clients. See L. ANDREws,
supra note 4, at 82-83. Thus, judging from the negative reaction to lawyer advertising from
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the major factors creating fragmentation within the American bar
is that small-firm practitioners are often compelled to subordinate
their professional judgment to the wishes of their clients in order
to ensure the economic survival of their practices.204 Advertising
might help to reduce this obstacle to the exercise of professional
judgment by enabling small-firm practitioners to increase their cli-
entele, thus lessening their financial dependence on a relatively
limited number of clients.20 5 Additionally, it might enable attor-
neys to expend more time and effort on professional education and
other activities that would redound to the benefit of both their cli-
entele and the bar.20 6 Only when lawyers realize the full extent of
the advantages of appropriate advertising will the R.M.J. decision
have fulfilled its potential.
VI. CONCLUSION
The R.M.J. decision is the most recent expression of the Su-
preme Court's readiness to extend the protection of the first
amendment to commercial speech by attorneys. By clarifying the
constitutional standards to be applied to the regulation of such
speech, the decision encourages states to remove ambiguities from
their laws and to permit such advertising to flourish. Widespread
use of non-deceptive legal services advertising would be beneficial
both to the profession and to the public, and it is hoped that the
profession will soon realize its value. Today's legal world is far too
complex for lawyers to make themselves adequately known to the
public by word of mouth alone, or by rigidly controlled use of lim-
ited forms of print media. In re R.M.J., by explicitly recognizing
that fact, will help provide a foundation for a balanced and mean-
the established sources of power in the legal community, such advertising has the potential
to alter the status quo. See, e.g., Andrews, The Selling, supra note 162, at 14, 48-49. But see
supra note 191 (some argue that advertising will decrease competition and lead to monopo-
listic legal practice in the hands of the firms that are already large).
104 E.g., Landon, supra note 181, at 461, 469.
205 See id. at 461-62, 467-68; Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 83.
200 See Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 89-91; Landon, supra note 181, at 482-
84. Landon conducted a survey to determine the extent to which the size of the community
in which a lawyer practices affects his attitude about his professional responsibilities. Lan-
don, supra note 181, at 459-60. This survey revealed that about three-quarters of rural law-
yers also engage in additional nonlegal occupations in order to earn a living, such as real
estate, banking, or farming. Id. at 472. Of the rural lawyers surveyed, 60% indicated that if
it were feasible financially, they would prefer to specialize in the practice of law. Id. at 475.
Advertising might help such lawyers to expand their practices to match their capabilities
and augment their professional endeavors. See Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 165, at 91.
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ingful presentation of information about legal services to the gen-
eral public.
